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Reform of financial regulation is a priority on the international agenda. At the call of the 
Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G-20), a number of new 
international standards have been issued, most notably Basel III. As a member of the G-20, 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)  is now on a faster track in adopting international 
standards. However, the key issue for the PRC—as well as many other emerging markets—
is to how to keep focused on the domestic policy agenda while adopting the new global 
standards.  Fortunately,  the  PRC’s financial system has proved resilient to the recent 
financial crisis. As a result, banks in the PRC find it quite easy to meet the new Basel III 
capital and liquidity standards. Basel III is only part of an effective regulatory framework. 
While phasing in Basel III, the PRC needs other prudential tools such as a new provision 
ratio, in addition to the provision coverage ratio. Activity restriction will be another effective 
tool  with  the potential to prevent banks from becoming  too complicated for bankers to 
manage and for the regulator to supervise. As we work hard to improve the effectiveness of 
the regulatory system at both the global and national level, we should remind ourselves of 
the importance of keeping the balance between enhanced regulation and promoting financial 
innovation—without the pendulum swinging too far.   
JEL Classification: E44, E52, E58, G18, G28 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The theme of this conference—The Role of the Financial Sector in Promoting Economic Growth in 
Asia—is very important. The financial crisis was born and bred in highly developed markets in the 
west,  but  it has affected emerging markets in Asia, including the  People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).  
The PRC was hit hard by the global financial crisis, predominantly through trade channels. Its 
policy response—“quick, determined, and effective” (International Monetary Fund 2010) in the 
eyes of the international community—largely comprises measures in three areas. The first is a 
major fiscal stimulus.  The public stimulus was concentrated in infrastructure spending. The 
government devoted an estimated 2%–3% of gross domestic product to higher social spending 
and incentives—largely on the  tax side—to support private consumption. The second is an 
exceptional credit expansion. PRC banks extended new loans equivalent to 1% of gross domestic 
product  in 2009. This outturn  was largely a result of the removal of limits on credit growth, 
supported by a relaxation of restrictions on property lending and a reduction in both interest rates 
and reserve requirements. The third is re-pegging of the renminbi to the US dollar. In July 2005, 
the central bank began to allow the renminbi to appreciate against the US dollar, peaking at a rate 
of appreciation of about 1% per month. In response to increasing volatility in the world economy 
and global financial markets, the central bank returned to pegging the renminbi to the US dollar in 
July 2008 (International Monetary Fund 2010). 
This policy package was  instrumental in ensuring the  PRC’s growth of 9.2%  in 2009 and 
contributes significantly to the global recovery. However, as the PRC has started to unwind the 
crisis response measures, the main policy challenge it  faces is to calibrate the pace and 
sequencing of exit from the fiscal stimulus and credit expansion, while making further progress in 
reorienting the economy toward private consumption. For the banking sector, challenges include 
how to maintain credit quality in light of the unprecedented credit expansion in 2009
1
The dynamic interplay of the financial sector and the real economy in the PRC sets the broader 
context for this paper. Instead of providing a full picture of the current state of the PRC’s financial 
sector, the paper discusses the impact of the PRC’s involvement in the international financial 
decision-making process on its domestic policy agenda; its approach to implementing new global 
standards, particularly Basel III;  and  some structural regulatory  issues that are outside 
international regulatory convergence but are considered extremely relevant for the PRC.  
, particularly 
with respect to lending to local government financing platforms and the real estate sector; and 
how to continue the regulatory and supervisory reform. In the post-crisis period, there is a clear 
need for both regulatory and monetary authorities to use prudential instruments effectively instead 
of quantitative credit control, while moving ahead to adopt new global regulatory standards.  
While striving toward convergence in regulatory standards for a level playing field across different 
markets, we should recognize that the starting conditions and future challenges of developed and 
emerging markets differ significantly. Other emerging markets may have similar priorities to those 
of  the  PRC’s  financial  and banking sectors, namely to  continue  building  a strong baseline 
regulatory framework, addressing immediate regulatory concerns and challenges in support of 
economic growth, rather than recapitalizing banks or reducing leverage..  
                                                 
1 The latest data suggests that in 2010 total lending increased by CNY7.95 trillion at the rate of 19.7%, exceeding the 




2.  THE G-20 AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
In an interconnected global system, major problems in one part of the system will eventually affect 
other countries directly or indirectly, by way of different channels. Developed and emerging 
markets, therefore, have a shared common interest in strengthening the resilience of the global 
financial system. This shared understanding provides the basis for developed and emerging 
markets to work closely together to design and implement new standards for the resilience of the 
global financial system and to secure strong and sustainable growth going forward.  
Of all the recent global developments, the most significant one is the increasingly crucial 
role of the Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G-
20), which has brought an overhaul of the global governance structure. The G-20 has its 
origin in the 1997/1998 Asian crisis that began in the financial sector and threatened to 
spill over from one country to another. Despite the absence of a significant agenda, this 
group has kept functioning largely because it has a balanced membership, and finance 
ministers and central bank governors from all major developed and emerging economies 
have developed a close working relationship, making communications easier during the 
current crisis. The origin and structure of the G-20 made it an appropriate and (eventually) 
effective mechanism to deal with the recent financial crisis, which threatened to spiral into 
a deep global recession,  and for international financial and economic cooperation in 
general.  
The G-20 has taken a central role in fostering international policy dialogue and advancing reform 
initiatives. The concerted and decisive actions of the G-20 have helped the world deal effectively 
with the financial and economic crisis, and the G-20 has already delivered a number of significant 
and concrete outcomes (Gokarn 2010).  
At the London Summit in April 2009, G-20 leaders transformed the Financial Stability Forum into 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to include major emerging economies,  with  an expanded 
mandate to promote financial stability—specifically,  to  coordinate and monitor progress in 
strengthening financial regulation. At  the Pittsburg Summit  in September 2009, G-20 leaders 
made it clear that going forward, the G-20 would be the premier forum for international economic 
cooperation.  
At the call of the G-20, the membership of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision—an 
institution set up by the Group of Ten (G-10) with exclusive G-10 membership—was expanded to 
include all major emerging markets. The Basel Committee’s governance body was also enlarged 
to include the Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision from these new member 
organizations (Bank for International Settlements 2009). All these changes are very welcome, 
even though they seem to be overdue. For years, emerging markets have argued strongly for a 
change  in  representation  on  the Basel Committee and the status quo of the global  financial 
decision-making process. It would be difficult to expect the Basel Committee to restructure itself if 
not for the pressure for change resulting from the crisis and the political momentum built by the G-
20 leaders for legitimacy and more appropriate representation, although its core mission is to 
strengthen regulatory practices and standards worldwide Since it was established by the central-
bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries at the end of 1974, the Basel Committee wrote up 
rules,  presumably for the global banking industry—involving countries outside the G-10  for 
consultation at the last stage of the rule-making process. The Basel II Framework, published in 
2004, is no exception. The recent crisis presents a window of opportunity to reach a consensus 
on reform initiatives that would be extremely difficult to reach under normal circumstances.     
Following these changes in governance, a number of Asian emerging markets, including the PRC, 




range of policies to tackle the financial crisis and secure a sustainable economic recovery. Thanks 
to its strong representation at the G-20, Asia is in a position to make valuable contributions to 
reshaping the global financial architecture, evidenced by the Republic of Korea hosting the G-20 
leaders’ summit in November 2010.  
The PRC’s membership of the G-20 (especially at the highest political level), the FSB, and the 
Basel Committee represents (i) the country’s commitment to work together with the international 
community to tackle the crisis; and (ii) its obligations to implement various international reform 
initiatives, particularly with respect to international financial reform and specifically international 
regulatory reform. “Major failures of regulation and supervision, plus reckless and irresponsible 
risk taking by banks and other financial institutions, created dangerous financial fragilities that 
contributed significantly to the current crisis.”  This strong language of the G-20 Pittsburg 
statement reflects the political leaders’ assessment of the root causes of the financial crisis and 
the fact that the regulatory system and supervision must take responsibilities for the crisis. The 
PRC goes along with this view and is committed, together with other G-20 members, to adopt and 
implement fully the new bank capital and liquidity standards and to  address too-big-to-fail 
problems (G-20 2010).  
Broadly speaking—as in other Asian countries, thanks to the significant structural changes made 
in the PRC’s financial sector and the improved effectiveness of the regulatory system—the PRC’s 
financial system has proved resilient to the recent crisis. As a result, the financial system and 
institutions in the PRC are facing much less pressure for financial restructuring and regulatory 
reform than in the developed markets at the epicenter of the crisis.  
However, differences and divergences between the G-20 countries are significant and perhaps 
inevitable. Various reform initiatives and global standards that have been developed in an attempt 
to reduce the probability and severity of future financial crises are largely focused on developed 
markets. Many details of these standards are also calibrated for these markets. The issue for the 
PRC, and perhaps many other emerging markets, is to how to keep focused on the domestic 
policy agenda as a priority while adopting the new global standards to serve our own markets 
better. This can be considered a more general issue for us all as we  engage in a global 
discussion on a set of issues where the implementation of global standards and the pursuit of 
domestic policy objectives need to be viewed  together.  But clearly, the G-20 process has 
accelerated the pace to adopt the global standards for its member countries and countries at large 
on a much faster track, and the case of the PRC is very typical.   
3.  BASEL III AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Global financial sector reform is very comprehensive, covering a huge territory. From a banking 
regulator’s perspective, the key development is the release of Basel III—the core deliverable by 
the standard setter for banking regulation and supervision. In December 2010, the Basel 
Committee  finalized and issued the Basel III rules text, which details the  global regulatory 
standards on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the central bank governors and heads 
of supervision, and endorsed by the G-20 leaders at their November 2010 Seoul summit. The 
chairman of the Basel Committee described the Basel III Framework as “a landmark achievement 
that will help protect financial stability and promote sustainable economic growth” (Bank for 
International Settlements 2010).  
The rules text of the Basel III framework covers both microprudential and macroprudential 
elements. The framework sets out higher and better  quality capital, better risk coverage, the 




the buildup of capital that can be drawn down in periods of stress, and the introduction of two 
global liquidity standards. Not surprisingly, according to the rules paper the application of the 
Basel III framework  follows the narrow scope of application of the Basel II framework—
internationally active banks (which remains undefined)—rather than all banks.  
Basel III is a major step forward in capital regulation. By raising minimum capital requirements 
substantially, stressing the loss-absorbing capacity of regulatory capital, and discouraging some 
risky activities, Basel III addresses a number of the weaknesses of Basel II. For example, capital 
levels for some Basel II banks in developed markets declined even from Basel I levels.  
Basel III does not present the technical challenges posed by the advanced approach of Basel II. 
Easy as it may be to implement, emerging markets including the PRC should maintain some 
flexibility to adopt other prudential regulatory rules that work best for their  national financial 
systems. While converging to a common set of global standards, such as Basel III, emerging 
markets are better off to use a mix of different policy instruments to achieve the safety and 
soundness of the PRC’s financial system, tailoring the regulatory rules and practices to national 
circumstances.  
The timing of Basel III works perfectly for the PRC—it was issued exactly when the PRC was 
entering  a new 5-year planning cycle. While drafting its forward-looking strategy, the banking 
regulator in the PRC plans to align the domestic regulatory system more closely with international 
standards by incorporating Basel III to improve the effectiveness of banking regulation. The 
regulator strongly believes that in building a more resilient banking sector, the key is to continue 
the regulatory policies that  have worked effectively in the  PRC while adopting international 
standards. The regulatory framework going forward will in the same way cover  both 
microprudential and macroprudential elements, more specifically a new capital standard, including 
a leverage ratio; the liquidity standard; and a new provision ratio, which is outside the Basel III 
framework and is intended to address the immediate supervisory concern for the credit quality of 
banks and the adequacy of the provision pool. A set of well-defined policies and procedures for 
the resolution of banks will be introduced, incorporating a bail-in mechanism. The strengthened 
regulatory system will be equally applicable for all banking institutions. However, some 
differentiation will be necessary to subject the systemically important banks to a set of more 
stringent requirements and to allow for a varying transition arrangement for different types of 
banks. In so doing, the regulator expects that any negative impact of following the new 
international standards will be reduced to its minimum for the sake of continuing support for the 
real economy (Appendixes 1 and 2 provide a simple comparison of the PRC’s approach and 
Basel III requirements).  
Reform of the international financial regulatory system is quite comprehensive and covers a huge 
territory. This paper is largely focused on Basel III reform initiatives. As such, it intends to provide 
a brief discussion of the main elements of the  PRC’s approach to adopting Basel III and a 
preliminary assessment of its impact on banks in the PRC, as the banking regulator is preparing 
to translate the entire Basel III framework into domestic regulations.  
Quality of capital 
First, the quality of capital will be raised with a much greater focus on common equity to absorb 
losses. Credit and market value losses come directly out of retained earnings and therefore 
common equity. Total regulatory capital will consist of tier 1 capital (common equity tier 1 and 
additional tier 1) and tier 2 capital.  
The change to the definition of capital alone is a substantial strengthening of the global capital 
standard. This is particularly true for banks in developed markets. In the  PRC’s case, the 
definition of capital has always been conservative. For example, tier 3 capital has never been 




absorbing capacity of short-term subordinate debt; and innovative capital instruments generally 
never find their place in the definition of tier 1 capital.   
Broadly speaking, the core equity tier 1 capital of banks in the PRC represents above 80% of the 
total capital. The impact of deductions from common equity tier  1 is limited, as it will reduce 
common equity tier 1 capital by about 2%. Most of the deductions come from investments in 
financial institutions outside consolidation, intangible assets, and deferred tax assets. However, 
the size of eligible tier 2 capital will be reduced following the strict definition, as a large part of the 
long-term subordinate debt will be excluded from tier 2 capital. At present, almost no financial 
instrument in the market can meet the eligibility criteria set under Basel III for tier 2 capital. Under 
the new rule, any excess general provision over and above 1.25% of risk-weighted assets will not 
be included in tier 2 capital, which reduces the size of the tier 2 capital of banks. This is because 
the current rule allows all general provision to go into tier  2 capital, perhaps justifiably in the 
interest of providing an incentive for banks to set aside provisions adequately.  
Risk Coverage  
Second,  risk  coverage  will be improved  under the revised new capital rules, especially  with 
respect to capital market activities. Trading book exposures will be subject to a stressed value at 
risk requirement. Banks must hold the appropriate capital for less liquid, credit-sensitive assets 
with much longer holding periods. Securitization exposures will be subject to capital charges more 
consistent with those for the banking book. The relatively simple balance sheet of banks in the 
PRC suggests that the improved risk coverage will have a limited impact on banks’ capital. In light 
of concern among investors in the  PRC, the issue of securitization  has come to a standstill. 
Moreover, the regulator will require banks to retain 10% of credit risk for securitization schemes.  
Level of capital 
Third, the new regulatory capital minimum will be 5% for core tier 1, 6% for tier 1, and 8% for total 
capital. The higher capital requirement for core tier 1 reflects the supervisory focus on common 
equity and, perhaps more so, what can be called the default composition capital structure of 
banks. The capital conservation buffer follows the Basel III calibration of 2.5% and the 
countercyclical buffer follows the Basel III calibration of 0.0–2.5%.  
The additional capital charge for systemically important banks will be for the time being set at 1%. 
All these changes will  lead to overall higher capital requirements of 11.5% for systemically 
important banks and 10.5% for the rest of the banking sector, challenging banks to raise more 
capital within the 5-year planning cycle.  
By the end of 2009, the capital adequacy ratio for banks in the PRC was 11.4%. In light of the 
higher capital standards, banks will still be under some pressure to raise more capital. However, 
given the lack of financial instruments for qualified tier 2 capital, banks will have to raise tier 1 
capital, mostly in the form of common equity and retained earnings. This will constrain the growth 
of banks’ balance sheets but the impact is likely to be manageable.  
Leverage ratio 
Fourth, there will be a new and higher minimum tier 1 leverage ratio of 4%. As under Basel III, the 
capital measure for the leverage ratio will be based on the new definition of tier 1 capital. The 
exposure measures on-balance-sheet exposures and off-balance-items as well as derivatives. 
Banks should calculate the off-balance-sheet items by applying a uniform 100% credit conversion 
factor and 10% for commitments that are unconditionally cancelable. However, given the lack of 
legal framework relating to some derivative transactions, the netting arrangement under Basel II 
for treating derivative transactions is not considered.  
The new leverage ratio is simple, transparent, and independent of the measure of risk that is 




measurement error. Moreover, it imposes a limit on the buildup of leverage in the banking system, 
which has proved effective in the cases of Australia and Canada. However, the advantages of a 
new leverage ratio may not be very significant for the PRC. A close correlation can be observed 
between the leverage ratio and the risk-based tier 1 capital ratio for banks in the PRC. In light of 
the lack of tier 2 capital instruments, at least for now, a high tier 1 capital ratio implies a high 
leverage ratio.  
Despite a higher target ratio of 4%, the banking sector overall has already comfortably met the 
requirement—an indication of a major structural difference between banks in developed markets 
and emerging markets in terms of business model and portfolio structure. Perhaps the significant 
increase  in  off-balance  sheet  activities in the future may help to increase the relevance  and 
effectiveness of this prudential tool. 
Implementation schedule 
Fifth, the PRC will be on a slightly faster track for the implementation of these capital standards—
targeting January 2012—1 year earlier than the Basel III timetable. Systemically important banks 
will be required to meet the standards in 2016 while other banks will gradually phase them in. 
Liquidity standards 
Sixth, the global liquidity standard will be introduced to supplement capital regulation. In addition 
to the current loan-to-deposit ratio, liquidity coverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio will be 
enforced while the regulator will monitor other liquidity ratios (such as dependence on core 
liability, liquidity gap, customer deposit concentration, and concentration of interbank fund).  
Liquidity regulation will be introduced in January 2012 following a 2-year observation period 
during which the regulator will assess the impact of the standards on banks’ operation. All banking 
institutions are expected to meet the standards by 2013.  
The new liquidity standard will have a similar impact on banks in the PRC as for Group 2 banks 
(basically small and medium-sized banks as opposed large banks),  as suggested by the 
quantitative impact study conducted by the Basel Committee released in December 2010 (Basel 
Committee  on Banking Supervision 2010).  Many banks in the  PRC already comply  with the 
liquidity standard, which is attributed to the business model. Only a few banks with special target 
client groups and business strategies have problems meeting the liquidity rules in the short term. 
However, banks’ difficulty in compiling liquidity returns shows that banks in the PRC have a huge 
challenge in improving liquidity risk management—from setting up policies and procedures for 
liquidity management; collecting data electronically; developing, measuring, and monitoring cash 
flow and maturity mismatch to liquidity stress testing;  and developing contingency plans 
accordingly. The abundance of liquidity in the system and the readiness of the central bank to 
provide liquidity support also weaken the incentive for banks to invest the liquidity risk 
management. The banking regulator believes that in the long run, implementation of the liquidity 
standard should encourage commercial banks to improve liquidity risk management  while 
remaining  focused on their core businesses and away from excessive reliance on wholesale 
financing.  
Provisioning  
Work on designing a forward-looking provisioning system is still in progress at the international 
level. At the London Summit, G-20 leaders called on the accounting standards setters to work 
urgently with supervisors and regulators to improve standards on valuation and provisioning and 
to achieve a single set of high-quality global accounting standards. In August 2009, the Basel 
Committee published a set of high-level guiding principles to assist the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) in addressing issues related to provisioning and fair value measurement. 




adjustments to avoid misstatement of both initial and subsequent profit and loss recognition when 
there was significant valuation uncertainty. Moreover, loan loss provisions should be robust and 
based on sound methodologies that reflect expected credit losses in the banks’ existing loan 
portfolio over the life of the portfolio. In addition, the Basel Committee has developed a concrete 
proposal to operationalize the expected loss approach to provisioning proposed by the IASB. The 
dialogue between the Basel Committee and the IASB on this topic is still under way.  
Before the IASB develops  and finalizes its proposal for a more forward-looking provisioning 
system, presumably with input from the Basel Committee, the regulator in the PRC largely will 
exercise supervisory discretion and judgment in urging banks to build strong provisions buffers. 
The objective for such a policy is to strengthen current provisioning by enforcing a new provision 
ratio  (measured by total provisions over total loans)  in addition to the current provisioning 
coverage ratio (measured by total provisions over total classified loans). The provisioning ratio is 
set at 2.5% and the provisioning coverage ratio is set at 150.0%. The regulator may adjust these 
ratios taking  into  account  the  business  cycle, the credit quality  of banks’  loan  portfolios,  and 
profitability to ensure that banks have a higher level of provisions during the economic upturn and 
a lower level of provisions during the economic downturn.  
The backdrop of introducing these two ratios is the excessive expansion of lending, low levels of 
nonperforming loans, and increasing profitability reported by banks since 2008. The lower level of 
nonperforming loans could suggest that the provision coverage can be very high and well above 
the regulatory benchmark while the size of the overall provision can be quite small. The provision 
ratio is focused on the size of provision in total and serves the purpose of raising the standard for 
general provision to recognize potential credit loss early. As banks build up their provision base, 
they are also expected to enhance their data system to reflect their loss experience in a better 
manner, hopefully putting in place a system similar to Spanish approach to dynamic provisioning. 
No need. The paper is not meant for people outside the financial Industry.  
4.  SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND BUSINESS MODELS 
Although the G-20 works hard to advance the goals of international regulatory reform, it is not 
possible or even necessary to harmonize all regulatory policies let alone supervisory practices. 
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 in the 
United States  (US)  is a typical  national  initiative  to  strengthen its financial  sector. As a 
comprehensive package of domestic financial reforms, many elements of the act align closely with 
efforts of the G-20 leaders, the FSB, and the Basel Committee. However, some aspects of the 
Dodd-Frank Act are outside the global regulatory framework.  Specifically, the act generally 
prohibits US banking firms (and the US operations of foreign banking firms) from engaging in 
proprietary trading and from investing in or sponsoring private investment funds. The act also 
prohibits US depositary  institutions from entering into certain  types of derivatives  transactions 
(Tarullo 2010). 
Since  the 1980s, activity and affiliation restrictions have been loosened in the US. At present, US 
regulators seem to be very comfortable in welcoming back activity and affiliation restriction as an 
important part of the bank regulatory regime, which serves to (i) constrain risk-taking by banking 
firms, (ii) prevent the spread of market distortion caused by the safety net to other parts of the 
economy, and (iii) mitigate potential conflicts of interest generated by the combination of banking 
and certain other businesses within a single firm.  
In contrast, there has been no clear regulatory distinction  between  commercial banking and 




securities-related activities and in some cases in the direct holding of large industrial interests. In 
the  United Kingdom (UK), there has been no clear regulatory prohibition  on  clearing  banks 
becoming continental style universal banks. The UK regulator thus concluded that it does not 
seem practical to work on the assumption that we can or should achieve complete institutional 
separation of utility banks from investment banks. In its view, large complex banks spanning a 
wide range of activities are likely to remain a feature of the world’s financial system (Financial 
Services Authority 2009).  As a result, despite  efforts to minimize the  incentive for regulatory 
arbitrage—featuring a higher capital charge on the trading book and securitization—at the global 
level there has been no rethinking of the need for regulatory distinction between investment and 
commercial banking. The measures introduced so far are intended primarily to reduce risk-taking 
by large banks rather than require disintegration into separate institutions.  
Discussion of the pros and cons of universal banking remains an open issue in the PRC. The 
current laws for the  banking  (1995),  securities  (1998),  and  insurance  (1995)  industries are 
consistent in prohibiting universal business practices and corporate affiliation across industries. 
However, all legislations have a carve-out provision, giving the government  (i.e., the State 
Council)  the  flexibility  to approve applications for universal banking business  practices and 
diversification into other financial and nonfinancial industries on a case-by-case basis. Under this 
arrangement, large banks have become well diversified in terms of business scope. For example, 
the Bank of China projects itself publicly as the most international and diversified bank in the 
PRC. In addition to commercial banking, the Bank of China is involved in investment banking, 
insurance, fund management, direct investment, and aircraft leasing, among others. The 
appropriate regulation of large complex banks is, therefore, also an issue for the banking regulator 
in the PRC.  
From a banking regulator’s perspective, the major contributing factors to the problems relating to 
systemically important financial institutions are interconnectedness and complexity. Size is, at 
most, a minor issue while substitutability may not be relevant for the PRC. Interconnectedness 
causes risks to spread from one individual  institution and geographic location  to another and 
across  different  industries, thus  paralyzing  the entire financial  system. Complexity poses 
enormous challenges not only to management but also to the regulator. Systemically important 
banks need to be identified and this can be achieved in practice without difficulty. As a result, a 
set of new policies governing these banks should also be put in place.  
The regulator’s focus is to stop banks from becoming too complex and reducing the contagion risk 
in the financial industry. The current approach to place restrictions on banks’ business activities 
will continue. On permissible activities, the regulator will allow, following a stringent screening 
process, qualified commercial banks to diversify into nonbank activities. Regulatory approval will 
be required for conducting complicated structural products, highly leveraged operations, or high-
risk nonbank activities in general. The current firewalls will continue to be applicable between the 
banking and capital markets, banks and their controlling shareholders, and banks and affiliations. 
The regulator will review banks’ performance in universal banking experience and may ask banks 
to divest if their affiliations in diversified businesses fail to remain profitable—measured by the 
industry average within a reasonable time frame. Similar to the Basel initiatives, the large banks 
will be subject to a higher capital charge. They will be required to issue bail-in debt to enhance 
loss-absorbing capacity. This will also require changes for securities regulation to ensure loss 
absorbency at the point of non-viability (Bank for International Settlements 2011). 
The regulator in the PRC takes a view on banks’ business models, stressing that commercial 
banks should focus on their traditional core banking business activities such as deposit taking, 
loan granting, and payments services as well as asset management services, primarily in fixed-
income products. Complicated business  models would pose serious challenges to banks’ 
adequacy in risk management. Banks are better advised to identify their niche market with tailor-




activities and other traditional businesses with a strong retail deposit base and limited market-
based funding. Given the supervisory concern for liquidity mismatch, banks are not allowed to rely 
on capital markets as a major funding source for their banking operations. Market-based financing 
should not be seen as a norm for prudent management of financial operations either by banks or 
other nonbank financial institutions.  
Going forward, the policy is likely to remain conservative, largely because of prudential 
consideration, to the extent that experimental projects for business  diversification will 
continue at a measured  pace. A consensus  is  developing  among regulators that all 
financial institutions are better advised to keep focused on their core business line. In 
addition, the banking regulator will continue regulation at the product level, considering it 
within its remit to prohibit specific products or product design features in both retail and 
wholesale markets.    
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Since the crisis began in August 2007, the world has gone through the most difficult years in the 
history of the modern financial industry. There has been a lot of soul searching regarding what 
caused this financial crisis and what needs to be done to reduce the incidence of future crises and 
mitigate their severity. Reform of financial regulation is a priority on the reform agenda.  
As the premier forum for international economic cooperation, G-20 leaders have agreed upon the 
general principles and a detailed road map for regulatory reform, providing political support at the 
highest level for national regulatory authorities to implement a set of global standards in pursuit of 
financial stability  in the interest of all countries.  Building a stronger financial system is in the 
interest of all countries. Globalization has brought many benefits but  it also means that 
weaknesses in one country’s financial system can spread to others.  
As a member of the G-20, the FSB, and the Basel Committee, the PRC is now on a faster track in 
adopting international standards. However, the key issue for the PRC—as well as many other 
emerging markets—is to how to keep focused on the domestic policy agenda while adopting the 
new global standards. Fortunately, the PRC’s financial system has proved resilient to the recent 
crisis. As a result, banks in the PRC find it quite comfortable to meet Basel III’s new capital and 
liquidity standards. Basel III is another important milestone for capital regulation, but it is only part 
of an effective regulatory framework. While phasing in Basel III, the PRC needs other prudential 
tools such as a new provision ratio, in addition to the provision coverage ratio, following the idea 
of a forward-looking provisioning policy—particularly to address the deterioration of credit quality 
following huge credit expansion in order to arrest the downturn of the economic activities indirectly 
affected by the financial crisis. Activity restriction will be another effective tool with the potential to 
prevent banks from becoming too complicated for bankers to manage and for the regulator to 
supervise. Before capital markets in the PRC become mature enough to help finance a significant 
part of the funding demand, indirect intermediation by banks will continue to be dominant in the 
PRC’s financial landscape. Therefore, the challenge remains with respect to how to keep the 
balance between enhanced banking regulation and promoting financial innovation—without the 
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Table A1: Calibration of the Capital Framework:  
Capital Requirements and Buffers (%) 
Common Equity
(after
Tier 1 Capital  Total Capital
Minimum 4.5 6.0 8.0
Conservation buffer 2.5
Minimum plus conservation buf 7.0 8.5 10.5
Countercyclical buffer range* 0-2.5    
Note: Common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital 
Source: BIS Press release, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital 





Table 2: Phase-in Arrangements (%)  
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the limit for DTAs,
MSRs and financials
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Minimum Tier 1
capital
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    8.00 8.00 8.00 8.63 9.13 9.88 10.50
Capital instruments
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capital or Tier 2
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1 Jan. 2013–1 Jan. 2017
Phased out over 10-year horizon beginning 2013
 
CET1= common equity Tier 1 capital; DTAs= deferred tax assets; MSR=mortgage serving right. 
Note: Shading indicates transition periods. All dates are as of 1 January 
Source: BIS Press release, Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital 
standards, September 2010 